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“Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to 
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own 
existence.”1 
Introduction 
Three police officers have just pulled up to a man’s house and knocked 
on the front door.  They tell him that they believe that he might be the 
victim of online identity theft; his personal information, bank accounts, 
social security number, and every other piece of his private life may now be 
in the hands of a total stranger.2  If so, this stranger now has the power to 
assume his identity, drain his bank accounts, max out his credit cards, or do 
anything else he wants under an assumed alias.3  The police tell the man 
that they can check his computer to determine whether or not he is the 
victim of this frightening crime, but they need his permission first.  How 
should he respond?  The last thing he wants is someone absconding with his 
identity, so he says, “Yes, my computer is right this way.”  The prospect of 
all his personal information in the hands of a stranger is terrifying and he 
now feels that he needs all the help he can get.  He also trusts the police.  
After all, their mission is to protect and serve and they did say that they 
were here to help him.  But what if this is not the case?  What if the police 
are not here to help him at all?  What if there really is no solid indication 
that he was the victim of identity theft? 
In reality, the police merely want him to give them permission to 
search his computer because they think it contains illegal images of child 
pornography.4  They do not have enough evidence of this to obtain a valid 
warrant to search the computer, but his permission to search is just as 
good.5  And now he has just given them permission to search his computer 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961). 
 2. See generally Saul Hansell, Visa Starts Password Service to Fight Online Fraud, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at C1 (reporting that roughly 94% of Visa credit card holders are 
vulnerable to online credit card fraud schemes). 
 3. See e.g., Scott J. Wilson, THE FIVE; Preventing Identity Theft, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
21, 2011, at B3 (reporting that identity thieves can use stolen personal information to access 
financial accounts, open credit cards, or even rent properties under an assumed alias). 
 4. See William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1903, 1905 (1993) (“Deception and advantage taking are . . . at the core of criminal 
investigation . . . .”); see also e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 308 (1990) (discussing 
the use of deceptive tactics by police as a means to obtain confessions from suspects). 
 5. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is equally well 
settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a 
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under the mistaken assumption that they are here to help him combat the 
potential theft of his precious identity.6  The police then search the 
computer under his grant of permission, but they make no concerted effort 
to search for evidence of identity theft.  Rather, they begin scanning image 
files, carefully looking for images of child pornography.  Soon thereafter, 
the police have seized his computer, arrested him, and charged him with the 
illegal possession of child pornography.  All of this resulting from his 
consent to search, given under the pretext that the police were looking for 
evidence of identity theft; that they were there to help him.  But this was 
just a lie, a means to gain access to his computer, access that they otherwise 
did not have. 
At its core, this Note is about the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution:  “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures . . . .”7  Specifically, this Note addresses the validity of consent in 
several unique cases in which uniformed police officers employed the use 
of a ruse to gain a suspect’s consent to search.  These cases, similar to the 
scenario discussed above, raise an extremely poignant and difficult set of 
questions pertaining to protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.8  
There is undoubtedly a need for officers of the law to ferret out and 
prosecute crimes, particularly those as heinous as child pornography.  But 
there is an equally powerful need to preserve the rights afforded to all 
citizens by the Constitution.  It is striking a balance between these two that 
proves especially difficult.9  As a society, we have accepted, and the courts 
have upheld, the necessity for police officers to sometimes lie in the pursuit 
of crime.10  For example, undercover officers lie on an almost continual 
                                                                                                                 
warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”); see also 
infra note 37 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the Fourth Amendment requires 
law enforcement to show probable cause in order to obtain a search warrant). 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.A (examining consent to search as one of the exceptions 
to the warrant requirement). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 8. See id. (providing protection against unreasonable searches and seizures). 
 9. See Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1956 (“The reason for many of [the doctrine of 
criminal procedure’s] complications may be that the doctrine aims simultaneously to achieve 
two very different goals:  controlling the behavior of police and prosecutors, and facilitating 
the central mission of the criminal process—the separation of the innocent from the 
guilty.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 609–11 (1895) (acknowledging 
that the government is entitled to the use of undercover agents in pursuing crime); see also 
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208–09 (1966) (acknowledging the necessity for 
undercover police activity).  
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basis in order to maintain their cover while building a case against the 
criminals with which they are in contact.11  The criminals have no idea that 
they are being deceived by the police, but courts have held that this is not a 
violation of their constitutional rights.12  In fact, such deceptive actions are 
a necessary and effective method for fighting crime.  Without such latitude, 
citizens could be subjected to all the various ills that crime produces.13  As 
such, all law-abiding citizens count on the government to provide some 
measure of protection against crime.  In turn, these citizens place a great 
deal of trust in their law enforcement officers.  But what happens when this 
trust is abused, even in the pursuit of legitimate criminals that pose a 
distinct danger to society?  Where do we draw the line between the 
permissible use of deception by law enforcement officers to gain consent 
and that which goes beyond what can and should be allowed?14 
Assuming that it is even possible to create such a bright line in the 
obscure realm of police deception, arriving at an appropriate answer is not 
easy.  Since the inception of the Fourth Amendment, many exceptions have 
been drawn to its rule.15  Inevitably, its waters have been muddied in an 
effort to strike an elusive balance between protecting citizens’ rights and 
prosecuting crime. There does seem to be a difference between, for 
example, an undercover police officer lying to a potential criminal and a 
police officer lying to a citizen by saying that he has a warrant to search his 
house, when in fact he does not.16  In the first instance, the suspect has no 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 208–09 (“Indeed, it has long been acknowledged by the 
decisions of this court . . . that, in the detection of many types of crime, the Government is 
entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity of its agents.”). 
 12. See id. at 207 (1966) (concluding that the deceptions of an undercover narcotics 
officer were not constitutionally prohibited). 
 13. See, e.g., Rachel Ehrenfeld, Perspective on the Drug War:  Whither Columbia, 
America?; Trafficking and Money-Laundering Stretch from Streets to Banks to Government.  
And We’re Losing, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at M5 (reporting that international drug 
trafficking and money-laundering has a devastating impact on American society). 
 14. See, e.g., Megan M. Rector, The Maryland Survey:  2003–2004, Recent Decisions:  
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, 64 MD. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (2005) (arguing that by 
allowing police deception in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion, courts have left 
citizens vulnerable to arbitrary invasions of their privacy). 
 15. See THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 28–32 
(2009) (examining and detailing the inception and evolution of various Fourth Amendment 
exceptions). 
 16. Compare Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 207 (1966) (concluding that the 
deceptions of an undercover narcotics officer were not constitutionally prohibited), with 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (stating that a blatant misrepresentation 
made by uniformed officers is essentially a form of coercion). 
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idea that the undercover officer is actually a police officer.17  Typically, the 
suspect intends to engage in some sort of criminal activity with the 
undercover officer.18  The suspect does not know that the undercover agent 
is an officer, and therefore he does not expect the certain level of trust that 
often accompanies police officers.19  However, this is not the case in the 
latter instance when the officer clearly identifies himself to the suspect as 
an officer of the law.  This person now has a certain level of trust towards 
the officer, whose primary duty is to protect and serve the citizens in his 
jurisdiction.20  Thus, within the scope of these two different scenarios, one 
form of lie is accepted, while the other is not.21  Courts and society both 
seem to generally accept this, providing two concrete guidelines for 
permissible police deception.22  But this still leaves an immense grey area in 
between which includes the hypothetical scenario discussed above. 
This Note explores a portion of that grey area through the lens of 
several similar cases that fall squarely within its bounds.23  Each case 
involves police officers telling suspected possessors of child pornography 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See, e.g., Lewis, 385 U.S. at 207 (noting that the undercover officer identified 
himself to the defendant by an alias, and not as an officer of the law). 
 18. See id. (noting that an undercover officer went to the defendant’s house with the 
express purpose of purchasing marijuana, an illegal act). 
 19. See David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie:  Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 455, 472 (1999) (stating, as an example, that judges operate under a principle that 
police officers are presumptively trustworthy).  
 20. See id. at 462 (stating that the foundation of public trust in the government rests on 
the responsibility of public officials to make fair representations); see also White v. Beasley, 
453 Mich. 308, 331, 552 N.W.2d 1, 9 (1996) (“The public-duty doctrine begins with the 
premise that police officers owe a duty to the public to investigate crime and to protect the 
citizenry because they are police officers.”).  
 21. Compare Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550 (stating that a blatant misrepresentation is 
essentially a form of coercion), with Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 609–11 (1895) 
(acknowledging that the government is entitled to the use of deceit by undercover agents in 
pursuing crime).  
 22. See Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1, 28 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court allows police to use deception to gather 
evidence and urge confessions). 
 23. See United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694, 724–25 (W.D. Pa. 2008) 
(granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a consensual search of the 
defendant’s computer because the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent); see 
also United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592, 612 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (granting defendant’s 
motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of the defendant’s computer because 
defendant’s consent to search was invalid); People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87, 100 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2009) (concluding that suppression of evidence seized during a consensual search was 
warranted because the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent). 
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that they believed that they were victims of online identity theft.24  
However, the officers never mentioned that they in fact wanted access to 
the suspects’ computers in order to search them for images of child 
pornography.25  Thus, the police used the specter of identity theft to gain 
consent to search these computers.26  In all three cases, the police found 
illegal images of child pornography on the suspects’ computers and they 
were subsequently arrested.27  Were these suspects’ Fourth Amendment 
rights violated?  It is a straightforward question, but there is no immediately 
clear answer.28  Each of these suspects was in possession of illegal 
material,29 but each of these suspects was also told a lie in order to obtain 
consent to search.30  The lie was not a complete fallacy, such as claiming to 
have a search warrant when in reality one does not exist,31 but the 
statements were not strictly truthful either.32  Thus, they fall squarely 
between truth and fiction, placing two directly competing issues at odds 
here.  We can allow “little white lies” like these under the justification that 
they are a necessary means to discover and prosecute criminals, but we 
would do so at the expense of fostering trust between law enforcement 
officers and citizens.  On the other hand, we can prevent the use of such 
deceptions in order to stop the development of such a void of trust.  
                                                                                                                 
 24. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008); 
see also United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592, 594 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (explaining 
misrepresentations made to defendant regarding identity theft); People v. Prinzing, 907 
N.E.2d 87, 106 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (discussing use of identity theft as a ruse to gain access 
to defendant’s computer). 
 25. See Prinzing, 907 N.E. 2d at 108 (explaining police’s use of a ruse to gain access 
to child pornography files).  
 26. See id. (explaining the deception used to gain defendant’s consent). 
 27. See id. (outlining events leading to Prinzing’s arrest); see also Richardson, 583 
F.Supp. 2d at 707 (detailing Richardson’s eventual arrest); Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 601 
(explaining circumstances surrounding Parson’s arrest). 
 28. See generally Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (detailing the Fourth Amendment 
analysis); Prinzing, 907 N.E. 2d 87 (detailing the Fourth Amendment analysis); Richardson, 
583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (detailing the Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 29. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing challenges of Fourth 
Amendment analysis).  
 30. See id.  
 31. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (holding that a 
patent misrepresentation made by law enforcement officers in an effort to obtain the 
suspect’s consent to search rendered the following search unconstitutional). 
 32. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008); 
see also United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); People v. Prinzing, 
907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
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However, the downside is obvious:  police officers would be restricted in 
their ability to pursue legitimate criminals. 
Part I of this Note briefly examines and outlines the relevancy of the 
Fourth Amendment to consent searches, since this document provides the 
ultimate backdrop for searches and seizures of citizens’ property.  Part I.A 
examines consent to search as one of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.  This Part outlines the necessary requirements for consent to 
be valid and the standards that courts use as a tool to analyze the validity of 
a suspect’s consent.  Part I.A.1 examines the scope of consent and the new 
guidelines that come into play in order to determine the constitutional 
parameters of a consented search.  Part I.B briefly outlines the concept and 
requirements of the plain view doctrine, another exception to the warrant 
requirement.  Thus, the entirety of Part I provides the background law 
necessary for analyzing the validity of a suspect’s consensual search.  Part 
II contains the three main cases that this Note focuses on.  This Part 
provides the necessary facts and the analytical processes each court used to 
ultimately arrive at a conclusion that police illegally obtained evidence of 
child pornography.  This Part also provides some personal analysis of each 
court’s approach to the issue at hand.  Part III examines the potential 
applicability of the plain view exception to each case, ultimately concluding 
that the facts of each case are such that the exception does not apply.  Part 
IV of the Note offers the suggested rule that when police officers are 
operating as fully disclosed officers of the law, they must state the main 
purpose of their visit to a suspect’s home in order to validly obtain any 
consent to search without a warrant.  This Part discusses and analyzes this 
proposed rule, ultimately concluding that it is necessary not only to 
maintain a semblance of trust between citizens and police officers, but also 
to provide firm guidance to police in the efforts to investigate potential 
crimes.  Finally, Part V concludes the Note. 
The issue discussed in this Note is so immensely complex because it is 
nearly impossible to draw a bright line between police deceptions that 
violate the Fourth Amendment and those that do not.33  The various Fourth 
Amendment exceptions that have been drawn by courts have served to 
carve away at the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment, but they 
have not done away with it altogether.34  The Fourth Amendment still 
                                                                                                                 
 33.  See e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (refusing to hold that 
the use of deception by law enforcement agents is per se unconstitutional). 
 34.  See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (“Prior decisions of this Court, 
however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number 
and carefully delineated’ . . . .” (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 
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provides citizens with substantial protections from invasive searches and 
seizures. 
I.  The Fourth Amendment as It Relates to Consent to Search Absent a 
Warrant 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”35  The Fourth Amendment protects 
one of the most fundamental rights in American history—the right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.36  It requires all officers of 
the law to obtain a search warrant, issued only upon a showing of probable 
cause, before searching a citizen’s home.37  Note, however, that certain 
exceptions to this rule do exist.38  Throughout American history, courts 
have vigorously upheld this right in an attempt to protect all citizens from 
police abuse during searches.39  Such judicial protections are essential to 
maintaining the validity and reverence of the Fourth Amendment in 
American society.40  These protections encompass a variety of settings, 
including a citizen’s body, movable property, and home.41  Of particular 
relevance to this Note are searches conducted within a citizen’s home, a 
                                                                                                                 
(1972))). 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 36. See id. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”). 
 37. See U.S. CONST. amend IV. (“No warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.”). 
 38. See infra Part I.A (discussing consent to search); see also infra Part I.B (discussing 
the plain view doctrine). 
 39. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of 
Thermovision imaging to explore areas of the home normally unreachable without physical 
intrusion is a violation of the Fourth Amendment); see also Steagald v. United States, 451 
U.S. 204, 222–23 (1981) (concluding that the warrantless search of the defendant’s home 
was a violation of his Fourth Amendment protections). 
 40. See e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 218 (1986) (“Since the landmark 
decision in Katz v. United States, the Court has fulfilled its duty to protect Fourth 
Amendment rights . . . .”). 
 41. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (noting that the Fourth 
Amendment provides personal protections from unreasonable searches in a number of 
different settings). 
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place that has commanded great reverence in American judicial history.42  
“‘At the very core ‘of the Fourth Amendment’ stands the right of a man to 
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.’”43  With only a limited number of exceptions, a 
warrantless search of a citizen’s home is unreasonable, and therefore 
unconstitutional.44  Absent this handful of special circumstances, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has consistently upheld this principle, 
essentially requiring all searches to be conducted pursuant to a validly 
obtained warrant.45  Thus, it is firmly established that the Supreme Court 
considers a search conducted pursuant to a validly obtained warrant as 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  However, once one departs from 
this principle, the judicially established boundaries of reasonableness 
rapidly deteriorate. 
Several exceptions exist that allow law enforcement officers to 
conduct a search absent a warrant.46  However, the Supreme Court has 
noted that these exceptions are relatively few in number and carefully 
delineated.47  Furthermore, the Court has been relatively hesitant in finding 
the existence of such exceptions that allow for a circumvention of the 
Fourth Amendment.48  These warrantless searches are presumptively 
unreasonable unless the government can show the existence of one of these 
exceptions.49  Based on the importance of the Fourth Amendment, it is no 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See id. (“In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded 
by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home—a zone that finds its 
roots in clear and specific constitutional terms . . . .”); see also Christine Hurt, Regulation 
Through Criminalization:  Of Breaches of the Peace, Home Invasions, and Securities Fraud, 
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1365, 1375 (2007) (“The cultural importance of home and hearth is 
well-established and embodied in the oft-repeated phrase ‘a man’s home is his castle.’”). 
 43. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 
(1961)). 
 44.  See id. (“With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a 
home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.”). 
 45. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 (“Except in such special 
situations, we have consistently held that the entry into a home to conduct a search or make 
an arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant.”). 
 46. See MCINNIS, supra note 15, at 28–32 (outlining several exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement). 
 47. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (“Prior decisions of this Court, 
however, have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number 
and carefully delineated’. . . .” (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 
(1972))). 
 48. See id. at 749–50 (noting the Supreme Court’s hesitation to find the existence of 
exigent circumstances that would allow for a warrantless search of a citizen’s home). 
 49. See id. at 750 (“Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the 
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surprise that the Supreme Court has been wary of creating judicial 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.50  It is also not surprising that there 
is a relatively high burden on the government to prove the existence of an 
exception to the rule.51  For purposes of this Note, two exceptions are 
particularly relevant:  consent and the plain view doctrine. 
A.  Consent to Search in the Absence of a Warrant 
“A search prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made 
lawful by what it brings to light. . . .”52 
The Supreme Court has firmly established that one of the 
specific exceptions to the requirement of a warrant is a search 
conducted pursuant to a citizen’s consent.53  Validly obtained consent 
renders a warrantless search reasonable.54  But this exception is not 
taken lightly, as the Supreme Court stated that valid consent is a 
“jealously and carefully drawn” exception to the rule prohibiting 
warrantless searches.55  As a result, several pivotal Supreme Court 
cases have carefully established what constitutes valid consent to a 
warrantless search.56  Perhaps most important, a citizen’s consent to 
                                                                                                                 
home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome 
the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.”). 
 50. See id. at 749 (“Prior decisions of this Court, however, have emphasized that 
exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number and carefully delineated’. . . .” 
(quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972))).  
 51. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (stating that the burden 
of proof rests on the government to prove that law enforcement officers validly obtained a 
suspect’s consent to search). 
 52. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927). 
 53. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is equally well 
settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a 
warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”). 
 54. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.22 (1967) (citing Zap v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946)) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth 
Amendment requirements . . . .”). 
 55. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (noting the care and diligence 
that the Court has used in carving out this exception (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 
U.S. 493, 499 (1958))). 
 56. See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223 (stating that the voluntariness of consent is 
to be determined from a totality of the circumstances); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (noting relevant factors in determining whether a suspect 
voluntarily gave consent to search). 
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search must be voluntarily given.57  Voluntariness of consent is a 
factor that should be examined under a totality of all the 
circumstances.58  Such circumstances can include the suspect’s age, 
gender, race, and level of education.59  Additionally, great weight 
should be placed on the widely shared societal expectations in 
assessing the voluntary nature of a suspect’s consent.60  Many lower 
courts have acknowledged this by placing a high importance on 
society’s values and expectations, concluding that voluntariness of 
consent is examined under these societal notions of fairness.61  In 
analyzing these issues of valid consent, two competing concerns 
come into play:  the legitimate need for police searches and the need 
to ensure the absence of police coercion in obtaining consent.62  In 
balancing these concerns, the Court established a test in Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, stating that consent is invalid if it is coerced, by 
explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force and is not 
a product of free and unconstrained choice.63  Thus, any amount of 
coercion used in obtaining consent will render the following search 
unconstitutional.64  As the Supreme Court bluntly stated in Bumper v. 
North Carolina, “[w]here there is coercion there cannot be 
consent.”65  But this raises another issue:  what actions constitute 
coercion? 
Determining what constitutes coercive action is sometimes very 
easy.  The application of force, an overwhelming show of force, the 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See MCINNIS, supra note 15, at 99 (stating that consent to a search must be 
voluntary). 
 58. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248–49 (“[V]oluntariness is a question of fact to be 
determined from all the circumstances . . . .”). 
 59. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558 (noting that these factors are relevant, but not 
decisive, in evaluating the voluntariness of a suspect’s consent). 
 60. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111 (“The constant element in assessing Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases, then, is the great significance given to 
widely shared social expectations . . . .”). 
 61. See People v. Daugherty, 514 N.E.2d 228, 232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (noting that 
voluntariness of consent is viewed in light of society’s notions of fairness). 
 62. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“[T]wo competing 
concerns must be accommodated in determining the meaning of a ‘voluntary’ consent—the 
legitimate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the 
absence of coercion.”). 
 63. See id. at 228 (“But the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent 
not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.”). 
 64. See id. (noting that even subtle coercion renders the resulting consent void). 
 65. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968). 
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brandishing of weapons, intimidating movements, and other such 
threats are all clear examples of easily identifiable acts of coercion.66  
Furthermore, certain misrepresentations used by police officers to 
obtain consent can constitute coercion.67  For example, in Bumper v. 
North Carolina, the Supreme Court stated that material 
misrepresentations made by police rendered consent invalid.68  In 
Bumper, police falsely stated that they had a warrant to search the 
suspect’s house.69  As a result, the suspect’s grandmother consented 
to the search under the assumption that she had no choice.70  Thus, 
the Court has established that such blatantly false statements are akin 
to coercion.71  Professor LaFave, a renowned criminal procedure 
scholar, echoed this notion by stating that when a misrepresentation 
is so extreme that it deprives an individual of his ability to accurately 
assess the situation in order to determine the potential need to 
surrender, then consent is not valid.72  Thus, it is firmly established 
that consent predicated upon blatantly false statements is not valid.  
But, the picture is not so clear when it comes to lesser deceptions 
made by the police. 
In Lewis v. United States,73 the Supreme Court refused to craft a 
per se rule about the use of deception by law enforcement officers.74  
The Court stated that such a rule would severely hamper the 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002) (listing a variety of 
behaviors that constitute easily identifiable acts of coercion). 
 67. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550 (holding that a patent misrepresentation made by law 
enforcement officers in an effort to obtain the suspect’s consent to search rendered the 
following search unconstitutional). 
 68. See id. (noting that the officers’ false claim of having a search warrant is tinged 
with coercion). 
 69. See id. at 546 (noting that the prosecution did not try to justify the validity of the 
search by arguing the validity of the warrant since none existed). 
 70. See id. at 547 (describing the grandmother’s belief that the officers had lawful 
authority to search the house since they claimed to have a search warrant). 
 71. See id. at 550 (noting that when a law enforcement officer claims he has the 
authority of a warrant to search a home, he is essentially stating that the suspect has no right 
to resist). 
 72. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 3.10(c) (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (stating that consent 
is not valid if it is given in response to an extreme misrepresentation made by law 
enforcement officers). 
 73. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 207 (1966) (holding defendant’s consent 
to search valid, thus validating the use of deception by undercover police officers). 
 74. See id. at 210 (refusing to hold that the use of deception by law enforcement 
agents is per se unconstitutional). 
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government’s efforts to pursue organized criminal activity.75  Instead, 
the Court stated that in this particular area, courts must examine each 
case based on its own particular facts and circumstances.76  However, 
the Court was careful to note that “[w]ithout question, the home is 
accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections.”77  Thus, a 
distinct grey area of the law exists when a police officer’s 
misrepresentations fall short of the blatantly misleading category.78  
Lower courts are left simply with an analysis framework based within 
the vagaries of societal notions of fairness and good faith.79  In turn, 
this presents a tough balancing act that courts must follow between 
weighing the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens against the need 
for law enforcement to zealously ferret out criminal activity.80  It is 
undisputed that valid consent must be freely and voluntarily given,81 
but it is decidedly unclear what degree of falsehood is necessary to 
constitute outright coercion.  However, the Court has established that 
the government must prove that consent was freely and voluntarily 
given in order to uphold the constitutionality of a warrantless 
search.82  But, if a citizen does consent to a search, additional 
limitations exist that serve to narrow the permissible parameters of 
the search. 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See id. (“Such a rule would, for example, severely hamper the Government in 
ferreting out those organized criminal activities that are characterized by covert dealings 
with victims who either cannot or do not protest.”). 
 76. See id. at 212 (“[I]n this area, each case must be judged on its own particular 
facts.”). 
 77. Id. at 211. 
 78. See Rebecca Strauss, We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way:  The Use of 
Deceit to Induce Consent Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 882 (2002) (arguing that police 
deception should negate any resulting consent to search). 
 79. See e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (noting that great 
significance should be placed on widely shared societal expectations of fairness in assessing 
a suspect’s consent).   
 80. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“[T]wo competing 
concerns must be accommodated in determining the meaning of a ‘voluntary’ consent—the 
legitimate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the 
absence of coercion.”). 
 81. See PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW:  A 
FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 269–70 (2005) (noting that an individual whose property 
is to be searched must give consent freely and voluntarily). 
 82. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (“When a prosecutor 
seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving 
that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.”).  
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1.  Scope of the Search Once Consent Is Granted 
Once a citizen does consent to a search, an entirely new set of 
guidelines comes into play to determine the scope of the search.83  Courts 
apply these guidelines in order to determine the exact nature and extent of 
the search to which the citizen consented.84  As a result, anything found 
outside the scope of the search is inadmissible as evidence.85  In United 
States v. Ross, the Supreme Court stated that the scope of a warrantless 
search is defined by the object of the search and the places in which the 
object might reasonably be found.86  As an example, the Court notes that 
probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in 
a van does not justify a search of a suitcase inside the van.87  Additionally, 
the Supreme Court stated in Maryland v. Garrison that limiting searches to 
specific areas in which it would be reasonable to find certain objects 
prevents the type of wide-ranging, exploratory searches that the Fourth 
Amendment seeks to prohibit.88  However, determining the scope of a 
warrantless consent search can become problematic because there is no 
warrant listing the specific areas that the officers have probable cause to 
search. 
In an effort to provide some guidance, the Supreme Court stated in 
Florida v. Jimeno that “[t]he standard for measuring the scope of a 
suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ 
reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See HUBBART, supra note 81, at 274 (explaining how to determine the scope of a 
suspect’s consent). 
 84. See id. (explaining how to apply judicial guidelines in determining the scope of a 
search). 
 85. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990) (stating that seizure of 
evidence discovered as a result of a search that exceeds its permissible scope is 
unconstitutional, and therefore the seized evidence will be excluded). 
 86. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (“The scope of a warrantless 
search . . . is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable 
cause to believe that it may be found.”). 
 87. See id. (listing several examples of reasonable places in which police officers 
might find specific types of objects). 
 88. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (describing the limitations and 
tailoring of searches to their legitimate justifications).  The Court continued: 
By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which 
there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be 
carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the 
wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit. 
Id. 
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by the exchange “between the officer and the suspect?”89  Accordingly 
courts should not apply a subjective test analyzed in respect to a suspect’s 
unique, individual characteristics.  Rather, courts should administer a test 
under an objective standard based upon what a typical, reasonable person 
would have understood the consent to entail.90  Lower courts have applied 
the objective standard outlined in Jimeno in a variety of cases, focusing 
primarily on the exchange between the police officer and the suspect.91  
Thus, an examination of the exchange between the suspect and the police 
officer is essential to determining the scope of the consented search and any 
limitations that might be placed thereon.  As Professor LaFave notes, a 
search conducted pursuant to consent cannot be more intensive than what 
the suspect contemplated in giving his consent.92  As a result, the test for 
the scope of consent is an objective, factually intensive analysis that focuses 
largely on the exchange between the suspect and officer.  However, there is 
an exception to the scope requirements. 
B.  Plain View Doctrine as an Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
The Supreme Court has established that police officers may seize 
evidence found in plain view without a warrant.93  Over time, the Court has 
honed and developed a fairly specific test to offer firm guidance in 
analyzing plain view issues.94  This test is specifically laid out in Horton v. 
California.95  In Horton, the Court stated three prerequisites that a police 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 
177, 183–89 (1990); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1983)). 
 90. See id. (stating that courts should use an objective standard for measuring the 
scope of a suspect’s consent). 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1277 (10th Cir. 1999) (Baldock, 
J., concurring) (focusing on what a reasonable person would have understood the search 
scope to entail based on his exchange with the police officer); see also United States v. 
Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 87 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that the standard for measuring scope is that 
of objective reasonableness). 
 92. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 8.2 (4th ed. 2008) [hereinafter TREATISE ON FOURTH AMENDMENT] (“[T]he 
fundamental point here is that a search pursuant to consent may not be more intensive than 
was contemplated by the giving of the consent . . . .”). 
 93. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (“It is well established 
that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a 
warrant.”). 
 94. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990) (outlining and developing this 
test).  
 95. See id. at 136 (concluding that officers constitutionally seized evidence under the 
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officer must satisfy before a seizure will be deemed constitutional under the 
plain view doctrine.96  First, the officer must be lawfully present at the place 
where the evidence can be plainly viewed.97  This simply means that the 
search or seizure that put the officer in a position to observe the object is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.98  However, if the initial intrusion 
is unreasonable, then the officer is not in a valid position to make the 
observation and the evidence will be suppressed.99  To meet the second 
requirement, the officer must have a lawful right of access to the 
evidence.100  As a result, the officer must be able to seize the evidence 
without an additional intrusion.101  Finally, the third element requires that 
the incriminating character of the evidence must be immediately 
apparent.102  The Supreme Court stated that the proper standard to 
determine this is the probable cause standard.103  Thus, if these three above 
mentioned requirements are satisfied, then any evidence that an officer 
discovers outside the initial scope of the search may still be admissible 
under the doctrine.  This doctrine establishes that the mere observation of 
an object in plain view is not a search and its main function is to permit the 
warrantless seizure of an object under the above criteria.104  The basic 
rationale for the doctrine is that if an officer lawfully observes an object left 
in plain view, then there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of 
                                                                                                                 
plain view doctrine). 
 96. See id. at 136–37 (outlining a three-part test for the plain view doctrine).  
 97. See id. at 136 (“It is, of course, an essential predicate to any valid warrantless 
seizure of incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in 
arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed.”). 
 98. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:  ITS HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION § 7.4.4.4.1 (2008) (describing the nature of the “prior valid intrusion” 
requirement). 
 99. See id. (“If the initial intrusion is unreasonable, then the police are not validly in a 
position to make the observations and the evidence will be suppressed.”). 
 100. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990) (“Second, not only must the 
officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she 
must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.”). 
 101. See CLANCY, supra note 98, at § 7.4.4.4.2 (“The plain view doctrine differs from 
mere visual inspection from a lawful vantage point in that the officer is also in a lawful 
position to seize the object without an additional intrusion.” (emphasis in original)). 
 102. See Horton, 496 U.S at 136 (“First, not only must the item be in plain view; its 
incriminating character must also be ‘immediately apparent.’”). 
 103. See CLANCY, supra note 98, at § 7.4.4.4.3 (noting the probable cause standard for 
determining the incriminating character of an object as embraced by the Supreme Court in 
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)). 
 104. See id. § 7.4.4.4 (noting that observation of an object in plain view is not a search 
and that the doctrine permits the seizure of such an object). 
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privacy in violation of the Fourth Amendment.105  Thus, the plain view 
doctrine serves as a legitimate exception to warrant requirement under the 
Fourth Amendment.106 
II.  The Cases—Grappling With the Problem of Police Deception and 
Consent to Search 
The previously mentioned framework for analyzing warrantless 
consent searches seems straightforward enough, but this is hardly the case 
when one must attempt to apply these doctrines to real cases.  The 
seemingly bright line rules soon become blurred as courts are forced to sort 
out the constitutional issues that inevitably arise in the pursuit of crime.107  
The following three cases are prime examples of this, and a brief 
examination of each will illustrate just how difficult these constitutional 
issues are. 
A.  United States v. Richardson 
In United States v. Richardson,108 the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania squarely addressed the issue of 
whether the defendant’s consent to search was involuntary due to law 
enforcements officers’ misrepresentations to the defendant that he was a 
victim of identity theft.109  Ultimately, the court granted Richardson’s 
motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his computer, 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See id. (outlining the rationale of the plain view doctrine according to modern 
jurisprudence (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993))). 
 106. See WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 20 (3d ed. 
2010) (stating that the plain view doctrine is “a legitimate exception to the warrant 
requirement for the reason that the Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable seizures as 
surely as it proscribes unreasonable searches”). 
 107. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) (“There are cases in which it is 
plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact 
there is such a right.”). 
 108. See United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694, 724–25 (W.D. Pa. 2008) 
(granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a consensual search of the 
defendant’s computer because the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent). 
 109. See id. at 707 (stating the main issues presented by Richardson were the 
voluntariness and scope of his consent to a search of his computer); see also United States v. 
Montoya, 760 F.Supp. 37, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“It seems clear that when the officers do not 
have at least reasonable suspicion that the occupants are engaged in crime, there can be no 
justification for resorting to false statements to get into a dwelling.”). 
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stating that while Richardson’s consent was voluntary, the search exceeded 
the scope of that consent.110  The facts of this case are relatively similar to 
the other cases that follow, but there are some subtle differences that 
undoubtedly affect the analysis of the defendants’ consent under the 
aforementioned framework.111  In Richardson, local police received a tip 
from federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents that 
Richardson had unsuccessfully attempted to access an illegal child 
pornography website on several occasions.112  Several local police officers 
then proceeded to Richardson’s residence, where they told Richardson that 
they wished to speak to him regarding some illegal credit card activity over 
the Internet.113  It is important to note that none of the officers believed that 
there was enough probable cause to obtain a search warrant.114  Based on 
this, the court commented that, “[t]he only purpose of the agents referring 
to the fact that someone had improperly used Defendant’s credit card was to 
secure his cooperation. . . .”115  Thus, the court determined that the officers 
inferred that Richardson might have been the victim of some sort of identity 
theft.116  None of the officers indicated that they were investigating the 
possibility that Richardson was in possession of child pornography, 
although this was clearly their main intent.117  After this initial discussion 
about possible illegal online credit card activity, the officers asked 
Richardson if they could search his computers and he consented.118  A 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 723–25 (granting Richardson’s motion to 
suppress because the police search exceeded the scope of Richardson’s voluntary consent). 
 111. See supra Parts I.A, I.B (outlining the requirements necessary for valid consent 
and the plain view doctrine) 
 112. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 696−97 (stating that Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement agents discovered that someone matching Richardson’s name, physical 
address, email address, and credit card number had tried to access an illegal website on 
several occasions). 
 113. See id. at 698 (quoting the officer’s testimony stating that he told Richardson that 
they were there regarding some illegal credit card activity over the Internet). 
 114. See id. (stating that the officer did not apply for a search warrant prior to visiting 
Richardson’s house because he did not believe enough probable cause existed); see also 
Investigations and Police Practices, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 89 (2009) 
(stating that police officers can conduct a constitutional search absent a warrant or probable 
cause based upon an individual’s consent). 
 115. United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694, 699 (W.D. Pa. 2008). 
 116. See id. at 700 (noting the repeated inferences made by officers throughout their 
visit to Richardson that he may be the victim of identity theft). 
 117. See id. (noting that although it was the officers’ intent to investigate the potential 
possession of child pornography, they did not indicate that this was their purpose for the 
visit). 
 118. See id. (noting that the officers asked Richardson for consent to search his 
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subsequent search of the computer’s hard drive revealed numerous images 
of child pornography.119  Richardson subsequently made a motion to 
suppress this evidence.120 
The court began its analysis by initially addressing the issue of the 
voluntariness of Richardson’s consent.121  The court relied on its 
earlier conclusion of law in United States v. Richardson (“Richardson 
I”),122 stating that Richardson’s consent was voluntarily given.123  The 
court subsequently concluded that the voluntariness of Richardson’s 
consent was the law of the case.124  The court determined that the 
officers’ initial statements to Richardson that they were investigating 
potential illegal credit card activity were not lies or 
misrepresentations.125  Instead, these statements were a possible 
explanation for the attempted access to the illegal child pornography 
Internet sites.126  Thus, due to the absence of any misrepresentation, the 
                                                                                                                 
computers and that he consented both orally and in writing); see also United States v. 
Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13, 18 
(9th Cir. 1973)) (stating that a consensual search is unreasonable if obtained by trickery or 
deceit). 
 119. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 703–04 (noting that the officers found 
numerous images of suspected child pornography after searching the computer’s hard drive). 
 120. See id. at 696 (stating that the court will address Richardson’s motion to suppress 
evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search and seizure). 
 121. See id. at 707 (addressing the issue of the voluntariness of Richardson’s consent as 
addressed in previous rulings of law); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.22 
(1967) (citing Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946)) (noting that validly obtained 
consent to a search renders a search reasonable).  
 122. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 726 (conditionally granting part of Defendant’s 
motion to suppress). 
 123. See id. at 710 (stating that the earlier conclusions of law discuss the manner in 
which Richardson voluntarily gave officers consent to search his computers). 
 124. See id. (“The voluntariness of Defendant’s consent for the agents to enter his home 
and search his computers is thus the law of the case.”); see also United States v. Tibbs, 49 
F.Supp. 2d 47, 51 (D. Mass. 1999) (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 
(1968)) (noting that consent must be "freely and voluntarily given"). 
 125. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 710 (stating that the officers’ vague 
explanations to Richardson for the purpose of their visit was not a lie or other type of 
misrepresentation).  But see Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery:  
Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 807 (1997) (noting that when 
undercover officers assume an active role in pursuing criminals, their actions can constitute a 
significant invasion of privacy). 
 126. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 710 (stating that credit fraud was a potential 
explanation for how someone else may have attempted to access the child pornography 
websites). 
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court determined that Richardson voluntarily gave the officers consent 
to search his computers for signs of credit fraud.127   
This is arguably the correct conclusion, but it is far from 
definitive.  Technically, the officers did not lie to Richardson since 
they were actually investigating potential illegal online credit card 
activity,128 but they clearly led Richardson to believe that they were 
investigating one matter—credit card fraud—when they were truly 
investigating another—possession of child pornography.129  Other than 
the mere possibility that someone else used Richardson’s information 
to attempt to access illegal websites, there really was no legitimate 
indication that Richardson was the subject of credit card fraud.130  Yet, 
the officers focused their conversation with Richardson solely on this 
remotely plausible theory.131  However, the officers never actually lied 
to Richardson by keeping the subject of their conversation with him 
intentionally vague.132  As a result, no concrete and obvious 
misrepresentation coerced Richardson to consent to a search.133  
However, the nature of the exchange between Richardson and the 
police did affect the court’s analysis of the scope of the search.134 
In analyzing the scope of Richardson’s consent, the court properly 
relied upon the objective reasonableness standard outlined in Florida 
v. Jimeno.135  Thus, the court focused heavily on the verbal exchange 
                                                                                                                 
 127.  See id. (“In the absence of any misrepresentation, the consent obtained by [the 
officers] was voluntary.”). 
 128. See United States v. Bosse, 898 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing United States 
v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1135 n.4 (9th Cir. 1974)) (stating that an entry premised upon a 
complete lie is not justified by consent).  
 129. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 719 (noting that the agent’s vague statements 
about credit card fraud led Richardson to believe that he was not suspected of possessing 
child pornography). 
 130. See id. at 697 (noting the lower court’s finding of fact that there was not much 
information indicating an attempt by someone other than the Defendant to access the illegal 
websites). 
 131. See id. at 719 (stating that the officers “presented the Defendant with a concern of 
the presence of a crime concerning his credit card being used on the Internet”). 
 132. See id. at 710 (stating that the officers’ vague explanations to Richardson 
regarding the purpose of their visit was not a lie or other type of misrepresentation).   
 133. Cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (noting that the officers’ false 
claim of having a search warrant is tinged with coercion). 
 134. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 712–13 (using the framework outlined in 
Jimeno to examine the nature of the exchange between Richardson and the officers). 
 135. See id. at 711 (quoting the language of Jimeno outlining the reasonableness 
standard). 
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that took place between Richardson and the officers, particularly 
noting the absence of any discussion related to child pornography.136  
The main subject matter of the discussion revolved around illegal 
credit card usage and the inferred possibility of identity theft, thus 
leading Richardson to believe that he was a possible victim, not a 
suspect.137  As such, any voluntary consent given by Richardson 
applies only to the subject matter of his exchange with the officers as it 
was reasonably understood by all parties.138  The key here is that 
although “illegal credit card activity” is a broad category, the officers 
led Richardson to believe that he was the victim of some sort of credit 
card fraud.139  Thus, a search for image files on the computer was 
outside the areas of the computer that would be useful in identifying 
possible identity theft.140  As the court aptly notes, “[i]f there is no 
meeting of the minds on the subject matter of the search [between the 
officer and the suspect], the consent to search cannot be found to 
authorize a search for any subject matter because the Defendant 
objectively lacks understanding of what the Government is seeking.”141  
Thus, the officers’ vague description of “illegal credit card activity” 
coupled with the inferences of identity theft provided a restriction on 
the scope of Richardson’s consent.142 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See id. at 710–11 (noting that there was no initial discussion of child pornography 
between Richardson and the officers). 
 137. See id. at 712 (noting that the context of the exchange between Richardson and the 
officers led Richardson to believe that he might be a victim of identity theft, not a possible 
suspect in a child pornography investigation); see also Jeffrey Haningan Kuras et al., 
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 90 GEO. L.J. 1130, 1176 (2002) (“The scope of consent 
is determined by asking how a reasonable person would have understood the conversation 
between the officer and the suspect or third party when consent was given.”). 
 138. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 711 (noting that the absence of any mention of 
child pornography limited a reasonable understanding of the search limits to only that of 
material related to potential identity theft). 
 139. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Panel Discussion:  The Present and Future Fourth 
Amendment, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 111, 119 (1995) [hereinafter Present and Future Fourth 
Amendment] (examining the legal morass surrounding pretextual stops in which an officer 
claims to detain a citizen for some innocuous reason when in reality the officer is searching 
for evidence of illegal activity). 
 140. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 712 (“With the subject matter of the 
conversation revolving around illegal credit card usage and Internet activity, a search for 
images was far afield from the subject matter of what Web sites the computers were used to 
access.”). 
 141. Id. at 714; see also United States v. Tibbs, 49 F.Supp. 2d 47, 51 (D. Mass. 1999) 
(noting that a court’s examination of a consent to search requires careful scrutiny). 
 142. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 713 (noting that the vague description the 
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This is clearly the proper conclusion.  The court was correct in 
finding that the officers led Richardson to reasonably believe that 
evidence of credit card fraud was the object of their search.143  Perhaps 
if the officers had not led Richardson to believe that he was a victim of 
some sort of online scheme, then their search might not have been so 
narrowly limited.  “Illegal credit card activity” is a broad and vague 
category with many possible understandings.  The officers did not tell 
Richardson a blatant lie, since accessing and making credit charges to 
child pornography sites is illegal.144  The officers were truly 
investigating illegal credit card activity on the Internet,145 but they 
subtly led Richardson to believe that child pornography was not the 
focus of their investigation.146  As one officer testified, “[i]n some 
definitions for a ruse—I may have used a ruse in the initiation of the 
interview.”147  Thus, the officers relied upon an incomplete truth to 
gain Richardson’s consent to search.  Such incomplete truths can be 
just as misleading as a blatant lie, and, if the officers had employed the 
use of a blatant lie, the evidence would have been suppressed without a 
second thought.148  Here the court properly rejected the use of such a 
ruse as a means to gain sweeping consent to search the entirety of 
Richardson’s computer, ultimately limiting the search’s scope to that 
which directly relates to online credit card fraud.149 
B.  United States v. Parson 
                                                                                                                 
officers gave for their visit resulted in an unintended restriction of what the objectively 
reasonable scope of the search could be). 
 143. See id. at 719 (stating that the officers presented Richardson with the possibility 
that his credit card was used illegally on the Internet, thus leading him to believe that this 
was the object of the search to which he consented). 
 144. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A (2009) (outlawing the possession or distribution of child 
pornography).  
 145. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 719 (stating that the officers presented 
Richardson with the possibility that his credit card was used illegally on the Internet). 
 146. See id. at 712 (noting that the subject of the conversation revolved around illegal 
credit card use on the Internet, and not images of child pornography).  
 147. See id. at 701 (quoting Special Agent Lieb who testified that the officers did not 
clearly describe to Richardson the type of illegal activity for which they were searching). 
 148. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (stating that a blatant 
misrepresentation is essentially a form of coercion). 
 149. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 713 (noting that the vague description the 
officers gave for their visit resulted in an unintended restriction of what the objectively 
reasonable scope of the search could be). 
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In United States v. Parson,150 the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania again addressed the issue of whether the 
defendant’s consent to search was involuntary due to law enforcement 
officers’ misrepresentations to the defendant that he was a victim of identity 
theft.151  In answering this question, the court properly examined the totality of 
the circumstances involved, including the defendant’s characteristics and the 
exchange that took place between him and police officers.152  The court noted 
that the defendant, Parson, was sixty-five years old, living in a trailer, 
supporting himself on Social Security benefits totaling less than $1,000 per 
month, hard of hearing, afflicted by cataracts, and taking medication for 
depression.153  The court noted that these characteristics are particularly 
pertinent towards analyzing the voluntariness of Parson’s consent.154  As a 
result, the court was decidedly subjective; they took into account all of 
Parson’s unique personal aspects in an attempt to analyze his current state at 
the time of the police search.155  This appears to be perfectly within the 
parameters for determining voluntariness as outlined by previous case law.156  
The presence of these various characteristics undoubtedly placed Parsons in a 
vulnerable position and the court specifically noted this.157  The court also 
stated that the presence of three agents, all inside Parson’s small trailer, served 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592, 612 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (granting 
the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of the defendant’s 
computer because the defendant’s consent to the search was invalid). 
 151. See id. at 594 (“The foremost issue is whether Parson’s consent to search was 
involuntary due to law enforcement’s misrepresentations to Parson that he was a victim of 
identity theft.”). 
 152. See id. at 602 (stating that assessment of the circumstances surrounding Parson’s 
consent includes analyzing “the characteristics of the accused” and the details of his 
exchange with the police); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973) 
(noting that voluntariness of consent should be determined from a totality of the 
circumstances). 
 153. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 597 (explaining Parson’s personal characteristics 
and current living situation). 
 154. See id. at 602 (noting that Parson’s physical condition is relevant in analyzing the 
voluntariness of his consent). 
 155. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
1263, 1280–84 (1985) (“The criteria of voluntariness affect the legal significance of acts in 
every branch of the legal system”). 
 156. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (noting that factors 
such as age, gender, race, etc. are relevant to an analysis of the voluntariness of a suspect’s 
consent). 
 157. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 607 (noting that Parson’s advanced age, poor 
physical and mental condition, and current living situation left him in a particularly 
vulnerable state). 
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as an intimidating force; a force that was further amplified by Parson’s 
vulnerable position.158  Parson even testified:  “I was afraid to refuse doing 
anything they asked because [sic] there’s three men there.”159 
Thus, it is clear that before even addressing the use of police 
misrepresentations, the court envisioned a scenario in which a partially 
disabled old man was intimidated by three officers in his tiny trailer.  From the 
findings of fact stated by the court, this does not seem to be an absurd or 
illogical conclusion.160  Undoubtedly, Parson’s vulnerable nature had a distinct 
impact on the nature of his interaction with the officers.161  In turn, this 
presumably had some influence on the court, perhaps to the point where it 
may have found that Parson’s consent was involuntary based solely on the 
intimidating environment present at the time.162  Nevertheless, the court 
rightly included an analysis of the effect that the officer’s misrepresentations 
may have had in influencing Parson’s consent to search.163 
The police officers initiated the conversation with Parson by stating 
that they were investigating potential identity theft involving Parson’s 
credit card.164  However, the lead investigating officer testified that 
although there was always the chance that Parson was actually the victim of 
identity theft, the reality of this was remote.165  This testimony, coupled 
with the lack of any evidence suggesting that Parson was an identity theft 
victim, strongly influenced the court to conclude that the officers did not 
                                                                                                                 
 158. See id. (explaining the intimidating effect of the agents on the Defendant).  The 
court continued: 
In this matter, three agents entered the small trailer of a sixty-five-year-old man.  
Speaking from the likely perspective of a public citizen, two agents seem to 
constitute a necessary and proper investigative team; however, three agents 
seem an intimidating force. 
Id.  See also Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable:  A New Paradigm for 
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 785 (2005) (“[C]onsent to 
search is ‘voluntary’ if the police have not used ‘coercive’ tactics in obtaining the consent.”). 
 159. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 607. 
 160. See id. (noting the overall vulnerability of Parson’s condition). 
 161. See id. (quoting Parson’s testimony in which he states that he felt intimidated by 
the officers). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. at 602 (beginning the court’s analysis of the officers’ misrepresentations). 
 164. See id. at 597 (noting that one of the officers present during the search of Parson’s 
home testified that one of the other officers told Parson that they were there investigate the 
possible identity theft involving Parson’s credit card). 
 165. See id. at 596 (noting that the lead investigator did not believe there was a high 
probability that Parson was the victim of identity theft). 
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truly believe that Parson was actually a victim of identity theft.166  
Additionally, the court heard testimony that the lead investigator told other 
agents that he was looking at Parson in connection to a child pornography 
case.167  This evidence, taken in whole, led the court to the conclusion that 
the officer’s investigation of Parson had nothing to do with identity theft.168 
Thus, the court classified the agent’s statements about investigating 
identity theft as material misrepresentations, analogous to those presented in 
Bumper.169  The agents presented themselves as focused solely on identity 
theft, inducing Parson to place his trust in them under the impression that they 
were there to help him.170  Parson’s age and physical condition made him a 
particularly vulnerable target for identity theft, presenting an even greater 
incentive for Parson to trust the officers to help him.171  Furthermore, the 
officers never mentioned that they were there to investigate Parson for 
possession of child pornography.172  In fact, after the officers found several 
illegal images on Parson’s computer, they stated that they were not looking for 
images of child pornography and that someone else was responsible for the 
legality of those images.173  Based on these comments, the court surmised that 
after being told that the officers were not looking for child pornography, 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See id. (concluding that the officers did not believe Parson was the victim of 
identity theft, nor did any evidence exist that he was); cf. Present and Future Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 139, at 119–20 (examining pre-textual criminal stops made by 
police officers). 
 167. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 596 (noting that the investigator told Pennsylvania 
state troopers that he was investigating a child pornography case while making no mention 
of credit card fraud). 
 168. See id. at 603 (“The evidence conclusively shows that the agents did not suspect 
any identity theft in Parson’s situation.”). 
 169. See id. (noting that material misrepresentations, such as those made in the case sub 
judice and in Bumper, are equivalent to physical coercion); see also CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
supra note 72 at § 3.10(c) (noting that when an extreme misrepresentation limits a suspect’s 
ability to fairly assess the situation, consent is not valid). 
 170. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 603 (noting that the statements about identity theft 
served to facilitate Parson’s trust in the officers). 
 171. See id. at 607−08 (noting that Parson’s heightened susceptibility to identity theft 
left him in greater fear for the safety of his limited financial assets); see also Ralph V. Seep, 
Annotation, What Constitutes Unusually “Vulnerable” Victim Under Sentencing Guideline 
§ 3A1.1 Permitting Increase in Offense Level, 114 A.L.R. FED. 355, § 2 (1993) (outlining 
enhanced sentencing guidelines as a means to provide greater protection to those particularly 
vulnerable to crimes like identity theft). 
 172. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 603–04 (“Additionally, Agent Stitzel did not warn 
Parson that he was a target, or that the agents were investigating the illegal possession of 
child pornography.”). 
 173. See id. at 605 (noting that after officers found illegal images on Parson’s 
computer, they still told Parson that they were not there to look for child pornography). 
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“Parson could only assume that the men meant to aid him with his newly 
realized identity theft problem.”174  Clearly, the statements made by the 
officers were “deceptive and deliberately misleading.”175  As a result, the court 
found that the “agents’ lies and trickery in this matter violated widely shared 
social expectations.”176 
Such lies serve to obliterate citizens’ widely shared social expectations 
that they can trust government officials.177  If the court were to tolerate such 
lies, it does not take much thought to envision the dire consequences this 
would have on society.178  To avoid such consequences, the court properly 
concluded that Parson’s consent to the search was invalid.179  The agents 
greeted Parson with a lie.180  The record shows that the agents had no 
indication that Parson was actually the victim of identity theft, nor was it their 
primary purpose to search for evidence of identity theft.181  It is clear that the 
agents only employed this ruse to gain Parson’s trust and consequent consent 
to search.  Parson’s current physical and mental state made him particularly 
susceptible to this lie.182  The fact that Parson later rushed to his bank to 
change his account numbers and safeguard other personal information is a 
good indication that he truly believed what the agents had told him.183  The 
agents never mentioned that they were looking for child pornography until 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 604; see also United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 425 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that when “the effect of the ruse is to convince the resident that he or she has no 
choice but to invite the undercover officer in, the ruse may not pass constitutional muster”). 
 176. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 605. 
 177. See id. at 606 (“Lies such as this, if condoned, would obliterate citizens’ widely 
shared social expectations that they may place some modicum of trust in the words of 
government officials acting as such.”); see also Stuntz,  supra note 4, at 1913 n.24 (arguing 
that lying is necessarily wrong because it promotes distrust). 
 178. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 606 (noting that the consequences of allowing law 
enforcement officers to make material misrepresentations to citizens would be catastrophic). 
 179. See id. at 608 (concluding that the government had not met its burden of showing 
that Parson’s consent was voluntary); cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 
(1968) (stating that the burden of proof rests on the government to prove that law 
enforcement officers validly obtained a suspect’s consent to search). 
 180. See Parson,599 F.Supp. 2d at 603 (“The evidence conclusively shows that the 
agents did not suspect any identity theft in Parson’s situation.”).  “Additionally, no objective 
evidence suggests any possibility of identity theft.” Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. (“[T]he facts of the encounter show that the agents’ statements about 
identity theft were constantly on the mind of Parson . . . .”).  
 183. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 605 (noting that immediately after the agents left, 
Parson went to his bank to change his account numbers and social security direct deposit 
information). 
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they actually found some on his computer.184  Even then the agents stated that 
they were not there to look for pornographic images.185  It is the totality of 
these factors that indicates that the agents’ statements were a material 
misrepresentation.  Although Parson thought he was consenting to a search for 
evidence of identity theft, he was unknowingly giving the agents permission to 
search for child pornography.  Such consent clearly is not valid.  The agents 
never gave Parson any indication of what they were searching for and, as a 
result, Parson never had the opportunity to weigh possible outcomes of his 
consent.186  The court is absolutely correct in stating that if such police tactics 
are allowed then society’s shared social expectations will be obliterated.187  
Citizens must be able to trust their government, but this becomes impossible if 
courts permit government agents to materially lie with impunity.  As the court 
states, the “absence of direct physical torture is not strong evidence supporting 
voluntariness of consent.”188  Indeed, there are other equally as coercive, yet 
far subtler, methods to gain consent.189  When faced with that dilemma here, 
the court properly concluded that Parson’s consent to search was invalid.190  
However, the court also turned to an analysis of the scope of Parson’s consent, 
assuming, arguendo, that the consent was not invalid.191 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See id. (noting that the agents stated that they were not there to look for 
pornographic images). 
 185. See id. (noting that the agents stated that they were not there to look for 
pornographic images).  The court continued: 
He asked the agents if he could get in trouble for having this type of picture.  
The agents responded that they were not the ones who decided that, and that was 
not what they were there to look for. 
Id. 
 186. See id. (noting that the agents stated that they were not there to look for 
pornographic images). 
 187. See id. (“The agents’ lies and trickery in this matter violated widely shared social 
expectations.”). 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. (stating that “the specter of identity theft added additional coercion and 
intimidation to the situation”). 
 190. See id. at 607 (discussing Parson’s age, health issues, and financial stature).  The 
court continued: 
Parson was sixty-five years old. His medical history includes frequent bouts 
with depressive mood disorders, for which he has been medicated.  He lived 
alone, subsiding primarily on a low fixed income provided by the Social 
Security Administration. His cataracts interfered greatly with his ability to see.  
In short, Parson was a particularly vulnerable target for a ploy regarding identity 
theft. 
Id. 
 191. See id. at 609–10 (analyzing the scope of Parson’s consent to search). 
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Alternatively, the court found that if Parson had validly consented to 
the search, the agents subsequently exceeded the scope of that consent.192   
This analysis was undoubtedly a means for the court to cover all angles of 
the problem, while simultaneously publishing the messages that such police 
tactics cannot be tolerated.  The court properly looked to Jimeno for 
guidance, stating that it must determine what an objective, reasonable 
person would have understood the scope of the search to include.193  The 
agents initially told Parson that they suspected that he was the victim of 
identity theft.194  There was no initial talk of child pornography, and when 
the subject came up later during the investigation, the agents explicitly 
denied that they were there to investigate that issue.195  Thus the issue is 
what a reasonable person would have ascertained the scope of his consent 
to entail based on his exchange with the law enforcement officers.196  Here 
Parson could only have consented to a search involving evidence of identity 
theft.  The officers explicitly stated that they were there to search for 
identity theft; therefore there was no reasonable basis for Parson to think 
that he was consenting to anything other than a search for evidence of 
possible identity theft.  When the officers searched Parson’s computer for 
images of child pornography, a subject wholly unrelated to identity theft, 
they clearly exceeded the scope of Parson’s consent. 
Yet again, society’s expectations would be obliterated if officers 
gained consent to search for one thing and then extended the scope of that 
consent to all things.  Citizens must be able to weigh their options when 
                                                                                                                 
 192. See id. at 610 (concluding that officers exceeded the scope of Parson’s 
hypothetical consent when they seized images of child pornography from his computer 
because such images had no connection to credit card fraud); see also Donald L. Doernberg, 
“Can You Hear Me Now?”:  Expectations of Privacy, False Friends, and the Perils of 
Speaking Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 
253, 298–99 (2006) (noting that a search by consent cannot exceed the limits imposed by the 
consenting party). 
 193. See Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 609 (citing the objective reasonableness test 
outlined in Jimeno as the proper mode of analysis for determining the scope of Parson’s 
consent). 
 194. See id. (noting that the agents gained admission to Parson’s by telling him that 
they suspected that he was a victim of identity theft). 
 195. See id. (noting that the agents clearly told Parson that they were not there to search 
for child pornography). 
 196. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (“The standard for measuring the 
scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ 
reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange 
between the officer and the suspect?” (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–89 
(1990); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1983))). 
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granting consent, but this becomes impossible if officers can freely exceed 
the scope of granted consent.  The court recognized that problem here and 
sought to address it through several modes of analysis.197  In cases with 
facts similar to those in Parson, other courts must follow this analysis and 
rule that the scope of consent has been exceeded in order to preserve the 
sanctity of the Fourth Amendment.  In the case at hand, weighing all the 
evidence appropriately, the court correctly arrived at this conclusion.198 
C.  People v. Prinzing 
In People v. Prinzing,199 the Illinois Appellate Court also faced the 
issue of law enforcement trickery used to obtain a suspect’s consent to 
search.200  Although the facts are similar to those of Parson, several 
important differences are present in Prinzing that serve to distinguish its 
slightly different holding.  Like in Parson, local law enforcement officers 
received information that led them to believe that Prinzing had purchased 
child pornography on the Internet.201  One of the officers then called 
Prinzing’s credit card company, which informed him that there had been a 
disputed charge on an old credit card of Prinzing’s that he had since 
canceled.202  The company told the officer that the fraudulent charge had 
been reported around the time that the card was first used to purchase child 
pornography.203  Officers then proceeded to go to Prinzing’s house, where 
they told Prinzing that they were there to discuss “possible fraudulent 
                                                                                                                 
 197. See generally, Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 602–12. 
 198. See id. at 610 (“When officers examined the seized computer for illegal child 
pornography images, they violated the scope of any such consent, and thereby violated 
Parson’s Fourth Amendment rights.”). 
 199. See People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (concluding that 
suppression of evidence seized during a consensual search was warranted because the search 
exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent). 
 200. See id. at 89 (stating that the defendant argued that his consent was illegally 
obtained by deception and even if his consent was valid, the subsequent search exceeded the 
scope of his consent). 
 201.  See id. (noting that local law enforcement received information from a federal 
agent that Prinzing may have purchased child pornography over the Internet). 
 202. See id. (noting that law enforcement officers contacted Prinzing’s credit card 
company and obtained information about possible fraudulent charges on his credit card); see 
also Bob Tedeschi, Retail Executives Are Uniting to Fight Credit-card Fraud in the Online 
Bazaar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2002, at C6 (reporting that credit card fraud costs online 
companies over $1 billion annually). 
 203. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 90 (noting that the reported fraudulent charge 
occurred around the same time the credit card was used to purchase child pornography). 
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charges made on his credit card.”204  Prinzing agreed to discuss the matter 
and he provided the officers with his credit card information.205  One of the 
officers then realized that the credit card number matched a card reported to 
have been used to subscribe to “a particular Web site.”206  The officer asked 
Prinzing for permission to search his computer in regard to the fraudulent 
credit card charges, stating that if there was any evidence that his computer 
had been compromised by unsafe Internet websites or viruses, it would 
likely be on the computer used to make online purchases.207  Although 
Prinzing denied having any suspicions that his computer had been 
compromised, he nonetheless consented to its search by the officers.208  The 
officer proceeded to search for pornographic images, not fraudulent credit 
card charges.209  After about ten to fifteen minutes of searching, the officer 
found several images of child pornography.210  This led to a more in depth 
investigation, culminating in the confiscation of Prinzing’s home computers 
and a taped statement by Prinzing.211  Prinzing ultimately moved to 
suppress evidence found on his computer, but the trial court denied this 
motion.212 
Upon review, the Illinois Appellate Court properly began its analysis 
with an examination of the voluntariness of Prinzing’s consent to search.213  
The court began its discussion by considering the totality of the 
                                                                                                                 
 204. See id. (noting that officers went to Prinzing’s house “under the guise of 
interviewing him about ‘possible fraudulent charges made on his credit card’”). 
 205. See id. (noting that Prinzing agreed to discuss the possibility of fraudulent charges 
on his credit card, and that he provided his credit card information to the officers); see also 
United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. 
Bosse, 898 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1990)) (noting that government agents cannot gain entry 
into a suspect’s home by completely misrepresenting the scope of their search). 
 206. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 90. 
 207. See id. at 91 (noting that the officer told Prinzing that if there was evidence of an 
unsafe virus, it might still be on the computer used to make online purchases). 
 208. See id. (noting that Prinzing consented to a search of his computer in regard to 
fraudulent credit card activity). 
 209.  See id. (noting that the officer only searched for pornographic images, not 
evidence of credit card fraud); see also Present and Future Fourth Amendment, supra note 
139, at 119 (examining the complexities of pretextual searches). 
 210. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 91 (noting that the officer found what he believed 
were images of child pornography). 
 211. See id. at 94 (noting that an in-depth search led to the confiscation of Prinzing’s 
computers and his subsequent agreement to provide a taped statement). 
 212. See id. (noting that the trial court denied Prinzing’s motion to suppress, concluding 
that officers truly were searching for evidence of fraud first and foremost). 
 213. See id. at 96 (beginning with an examination of the voluntariness of Prinzing’s 
consent). 
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circumstances involved in Prinzing’s ultimate consent to search.214  The 
analysis does not mention Prinzing’s age, race, educational background, or 
other such determinative factors.215  However, in analyzing the 
voluntariness of Prinzing’s consent, one can probably assume that Prinzing 
was a man of average age and intelligence because the court does not note 
otherwise.216  In the analysis of Prinzing’s consent, the main issue was 
whether or not the officers engaged in deceit or trickery that manifestly 
affected Prinzing’s ability to voluntarily consent to a search of his 
computer.217  Here it is important to note that the officers admitted that they 
had no actual information that Prinzing’s credit card had been used 
fraudulently nor did they ever mention the words “child pornography” in 
their discussions with Prinzing.218  Additionally, the officers never informed 
Prinzing that his credit card might have been used to purchase child 
pornography.219  However, the appellate court determined that it was 
undisputed that the officers had legitimate information regarding disputed 
credit card charges that took place around the same time that child 
pornography website charges were incurred.220  Thus the court concluded 
that the police officers had not fully resolved whether or not the disputed 
                                                                                                                 
 214. See id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)) (noting that 
an examination of the totality of the circumstances is the best place to begin). 
 215. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (noting that these 
factors are relevant, but not decisive, in evaluating the voluntariness of a suspect’s consent). 
 216. The failure to mention any unique or differentiating characteristics of Prinzing 
supports an inference that he was of average age, intelligence, etc.  Cf. United States v. 
Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592, 607 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (detailing Parson’s unique personal 
characteristics, leading to the conclusion that he was more susceptible to outside influence 
than the average person). 
 217. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 96 (“This leaves us to first determine whether the trial 
court’s factual determination that Detective Smith did not engage in trickery, deceit, or 
subterfuge when he asked to search defendant’s computer . . . is against the manifest weight 
of the evidence.”). 
 218. See id. at 93 (noting that officers had no information that Prinzing’s card had 
actually been used fraudulently and that they never mentioned that they were also 
investigating child pornography). 
 219. See id. (noting that the officers did not tell Prinzing that his credit card may have 
been used to purchase child pornography); see also Jason E. Zakai, You Say Yes, But Can I 
Say No?:  The Future of Third-Party Consent Searches After Georgia v. Randolph, 73 
BROOK. L. REV. 421, 425–26 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s paradigm for the consent 
search doctrine has become less focused on the subjective test of the defendant’s 
voluntariness and more concerned with the objective test of whether the officer compelled 
the defendant’s consent.”). 
 220. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 97 (noting that the child pornography charges were 
incurred around the same time that disputed charges took place on Prinzing’s credit card). 
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charges were related to the child pornography website charges.221  As a 
result, the police officers did not make any manifest misrepresentations 
when they told Prinzing that they were investigating fraudulent credit card 
charges.222  Therefore, the court concluded that Prinzing’s consent to search 
was voluntary.223 
Several distinct problems arise with this conclusion, particularly 
surrounding the fairness of its application.224  The court stated that the 
officers were “not required to provide [the] defendant with every piece of 
information that [they] possessed while investigating the matter.”225  
Although this may be true, credit card fraud was clearly not the main reason 
for the officers’ visit to Prinzing’s house—it was the information they had 
received from federal agents about possible child pornography charges on 
Prinzing’s credit card.226  Furthermore, the officers that investigated 
Prinzing were specifically assigned to review cases that involve Internet 
child pornography, not credit card fraud.227  Additionally, the federal agent 
never mentioned credit card fraud to the investigating officers nor was there 
any information that suggested that someone other than Prinzing had used 
the credit card to visit the child pornography sites.228  Finally, the officer 
                                                                                                                 
 221. See id. at 97−98 (“[T]he police had not resolved whether the disputed credit card 
charge was related to the child pornography Web site charges.”). 
 222. See id. at 98 (noting that the police did not make any blatant misrepresentations 
since the credit card fraud issue was not fully resolved); cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 
U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (holding that a patent misrepresentation made by law enforcement 
officers in an effort to obtain the suspect’s consent to search rendered the following search 
unconstitutional). 
 223. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 98 (concluding that Prinzing voluntarily consented to 
the search of his computer). 
 224. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (noting that great significance 
should be placed on widely shared societal expectations of fairness in assessing a suspect’s 
consent).   
 225. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 97. 
 226. See id. at 89–90 (noting that the officers’ investigation of Prinzing only began after 
they received information from federal agents that Prinzing may have purchased child 
pornography on the Internet); cf. Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in 
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1461 (1996) (noting the idea 
that the guilty seem perhaps less deserving of a right to privacy which they have abused). 
 227. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 92 (noting that the officers involved in the 
investigation were assigned to handle Internet child pornography cases, indicating that they 
really were not concerned about potential credit card fraud). 
 228. See id. (noting that there was no legitimate indication that anyone other than 
Prinzing had used the credit card to purchase child pornography on the Internet, thus 
virtually eliminating the potential for credit card fraud); see also Tracey Maclin, The Good 
and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 27 
(2008) (“[W]hether a person’s consent is voluntary simply depends on all of the facts of the 
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who conducted the search of Prinzing’s computer began with a scan to 
search for images associated with previously visited websites.229  The 
officer insisted that he was only looking for images of the Visa logo, not 
child pornography.230  Clearly this is tenuous at best.  Here the evidence 
clearly tends to show that the officers had no intention of actually 
investigating Prinzing’s computer for signs of credit card fraud.  Instead 
their real purpose was to search Prinzing’s computer for images of child 
pornography based on a tip they had received from federal agents.231   
Yet the court ultimately concluded that the officers had a “twofold 
purpose” for their visit to Prinzing’s house.232  However, this notion of a 
“twofold purpose” is extremely problematic.  Under this conclusion, 
officers can use even the most tenuous hypothetical scenarios to mask their 
true intentions for wanting to search a suspect’s property.  Such a 
conclusion opens the door to massive police abuse, in turn creating an 
environment that inherently undermines the trust that citizens place in law 
enforcement officers.233  It suddenly becomes impossible for a citizen to 
determine the reason officers wish to search his property.  How can 
someone grant voluntary consent in a scenario in which he does not truly 
know what he is consenting to?  Here, Prinzing consented to a search of his 
computer under the belief that officers were searching for evidence of credit 
card fraud, not child pornography.234  Yet this was not the case, as the 
officers took advantage of the situation to gain access to Prinzing’s 
computer.235  Thus, the court’s conclusion that Prinzing voluntarily gave 
consent is highly questionable. 
                                                                                                                 
case.”). 
 229. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 91 (noting that officer began the computer search with 
an image scan for Internet images). 
 230. See id. (noting that the officer was looking for images of the Visa logo, not child 
pornography). 
 231. See id. at 90 (stating that one of the investigating officers received a tip from an 
ICE agent that the Defendant’s credit card had been used to purchase child pornography and 
that this tip prompted the officer to begin investigating the Defendant). 
 232. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 98 (noting that the officers had “the twofold purpose” 
of looking for both credit card fraud and child pornography). 
 233. See Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1913 n.24 (stating that lying promotes distrust). 
 234. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 91 (noting that the officers told Prinzing that they 
were investigating potential credit card fraud). 
 235. See id. at 91 (noting that the officers asked to search the defendant’s computer 
with the stated intent to determine how credit card information may have been stolen). 
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The court does ultimately arrive at the overall proper conclusion after 
an examination of the scope of Prinzing’s consent.236After an examination 
of the facts, the court determined that the officers’ search exceeded the 
scope of Prinzing’s consent.237  As a result, the court concluded that a 
suppression of the evidence was warranted.238  The court stated that the 
officer, “by his own words, limited the scope of the intended computer 
search.”239  The officer specifically requested to search Prinzing’s computer 
for viruses or other such programs to determine whether or not Prinzing’s 
credit card information had been stolen.240  During their interactions with 
Prinzing, the officers made no mention of child pornography or the fact that 
his credit card may have been used to purchase child pornography.241  Thus, 
based on the exchange between the officers and Prinzing, the court 
determined that the officers limited the scope of their search to evidence 
pertaining to credit card fraud.242  As a result, any image search conducted 
on the computer exceeded the scope of Prinzing’s consent because no 
image could lead the officers to discover evidence of a virus or other 
programs that could steal Prinzing’s credit card information as such 
programs would not be embedded in an image file.243  Because Prinzing 
consented to a search for evidence of credit card fraud, the scope was 
limited only to file areas in which such evidence might exist.244  The only 
                                                                                                                 
 236. See id. at 99−100 (finding that the officer’s search of the defendant’s computer 
exceeded the scope of the defendant’s consent). 
 237. See id. (determining that the officers exceeded the scope of the defendant’s 
consent). 
 238. See id. (“We accordingly conclude that suppression was warranted.”). 
 239. Id.; see also United States v. Benezario, 339 F.Supp. 2d 361, 367 (D.P.R. 2004) 
(“A search conducted pursuant to consent may not exceed the scope of the consent sought 
and given.” (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991))). 
 240. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 100 (noting that the officer only stated that he wished 
to search Prinzing’s computer for evidence of credit card fraud). 
 241. See id. at 93 (noting that the officers did not tell Prinzing that his credit card may 
have been used to purchase child pornography).  But see Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth 
Amendment as a Device For Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (1983) 
(noting that there is no implicit Fourth Amendment right to be secure from the government 
finding evidence of a crime). 
 242. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 100 (“Detective Smith’s search exceeded the scope of 
defendant’s consent.”). 
 243. See id. (noting that programs which could steal credit card information would not 
exist in image files, thus making a search of such images beyond the scope of Prinzing’s 
consent). 
 244. See id. at 99 (“Defendant consented to a search only for viruses, not images.”); see 
also Benezario, 339 F.Supp. 2d at 367 (“A search conducted pursuant to consent may not 
exceed the scope of the consent sought and given.” (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 
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way for the officers to obtain evidence of child pornography on Prinzing’s 
computer was to search image files, thus exceeding the scope of Prinzing’s 
consent.245  Ultimately, the court did arrive at the proper conclusion by 
determining that the images obtained from the search conducted of 
Prinzing’s computer were beyond the scope of his consent, therefore 
making the search illegal.246 
Hence, the court upheld the officers’ clear use of subterfuge to gain 
Prinzing’s consent to search his computer, but they drastically limited the 
scope of the search based on the exchange between Prinzing and the 
officers.247  Ultimately, the court arrived at the correct conclusion, but not 
before opening the door for massive police abuses.  It is fairly clear that the 
police had no real intention to search for credit card fraud.248  They were 
simply using this as a ruse to gain access to image files on Prinzing’s 
computer.249  Yet, the court upheld the validity of this ruse.250  They 
allowed the officers to gain access to Prinzing’s computer via a lie, but then 
they severely restricted the scope of the search to the areas of the computer 
related to that initial lie.  Why not just conclude that the consent was invalid 
because it was not voluntarily given? 
Although non-material misrepresentation is not always a deciding 
factor by itself in determining the validity of consent, it still plays a critical 
role.251  The court in Parson recognized this and correctly ruled that 
Parson’s consent was involuntary because the officers lied to him.252  
Although here, in Prinzing, there was actually a contested credit card 
                                                                                                                 
(1991))). 
 245. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 100 (noting that programs which could steal credit 
card information would not exist in image files, thus making a search of such images beyond 
the scope of Prinzing’s consent). 
 246. See id. (concluding that suppression was warranted because the search exceeded 
the scope of Prinzing’s consent since evidence of credit card fraud would not exist in image 
files). 
 247. See id. at 99 (examining the verbal exchange between Prinzing and the officers). 
 248. See id. at 90 (noting that the investigation of Prinzing began with the tip from the 
ICE agent about child pornography). 
 249. See id. at 97 (noting that the officers did not mention child pornography to the 
defendant). 
 250. See id. (noting that the officers did not necessarily lie because they had yet not 
fully resolved what the disputed credit card charge was). 
 251. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973) (noting that 
voluntariness of consent should be determined from a totality of the circumstances, not 
simply one factor). 
 252. See United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592, 605 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (noting that 
the officers explicitly told Parson that they were not there to investigate child pornography). 
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charge involved.253  Nevertheless, the overall relation of this to the police 
officers’ investigation was clearly erroneous.  In fact, its only relation was 
that it occurred at roughly the same time that charges were made on a child 
pornography website.254  This relation is far too tenuous to justify the 
court’s determination.  In essence, Prinzing consented to a lie and a court 
should not hold that such consent is valid.  In doing so, the court gave 
government agents far too much latitude to use deception in obtaining 
consents to search.  This is exactly what prior courts sought to stop in an 
effort to preserve citizens’ Fourth Amendment protections.255  The court in 
Prinzing is correct in determining that police officers do not have to give a 
suspect every piece of information they have while investigating a 
matter.256  However, courts should not extend this concept to the extent that 
the court did in Prinzing.257  The police withheld not only the main reason 
for their investigation of Prinzing, but essentially the only reason.258  Where 
do we draw the line? 
III.  Potential Application of the Plain View Doctrine 
The Richardson court was the only one to directly address the 
potential application of the plain view doctrine to the present facts, but each 
of the previous three cases merit a brief discussion of the possible 
application of the plain view doctrine.259  In Richardson, the court 
specifically stated that a plain view argument for the discovery of the 
pornographic images fails because such images fell outside the scope of the 
                                                                                                                 
 253.  See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 97 (noting that there was a disputed credit card 
charge). 
 254. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 98 (noting that the disputed credit card charge 
occurred around the same time that the charge was made to a child pornography website, 
providing a loose basis for a credit card fraud theory). 
 255. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (holding that a patent 
misrepresentation made by law enforcement officers in an effort to obtain the suspect’s 
consent to search rendered the following search unconstitutional). 
 256. See Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 97 (stating that the investigating officer “was not 
required to provide defendant with every piece of information that he possessed by 
investigating the matter”). 
 257. See id.  
 258. See id. at 99 (noting that the subject of the exchange between the defendant and 
the officer was limited only to potential credit card fraud). 
 259. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 716 (beginning an analysis of the facts under 
the plain view doctrine). 
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search for illegal credit card activity.260  The image files were not in any of 
the officers’ plain view, as shown by the fact that the officers had to open 
the files to view the images contained therein.261  The opening of these files 
took the officers beyond the scope of the consented search to areas of the 
computer in which they did not have lawful access.262  As discussed 
previously, the scope of Richardson’s consent limited the officers to 
investigate only the areas of the computer where evidence could be found 
of some sort of credit card fraud.263  Without getting too far into the subject 
regarding the complicated technical nature of computers and all the privacy 
issues that accompany it, it is sufficient to say that evidence of online credit 
card fraud would not exist in image files.264  The contents of such image 
files were not in plain view on the computer; the officers should have been 
looking in other file areas of the computer for evidence of Internet fraud.265  
The analysis might be very different if Richardson had open images of child 
pornography on his computer when the officers began their search.  Such 
images would then appear in plain view to anyone who had access to the 
computer, regardless of how limited that access might have been.  In that 
case, such images might fall under the plain view exception; however, that 
was not the case. 
Nor was this the case in Parson and Prinzing.266  Although the courts 
in neither of these cases engaged in a discussion of the applicability of the 
plain view doctrine to the facts of the cases, it is fairly clear that such an 
application would be unwarranted.267  In both cases, the images were 
                                                                                                                 
 260. See id. (“A ‘plain view’ argument for discovery of the child pornography also fails 
because the consented search was limited to a concern for the ‘[illegal] credit card activity 
over the Internet,’ not images.”). 
 261. See id. (noting that the closed image files were outside of the plain view of the 
officers). 
 262. See id. (stating that the officers proceeded to open image files that they were not 
permitted by the scope of Richardson’s consent to be viewing); see also United States v. 
Maldonado Garcia, 655 F.Supp. 1363, 1366 (D.P.R. 1987) (noting that the scope of a 
consent search must conform to precise limits). 
 263. See supra Part II.A (examining the Richardson case). 
 264. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 715 (quoting EOGHAN CASEY, DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME 279 (2d ed. 2004)) (describing the manner in which a 
computer stores and logs Internet activity). 
 265. See id. at 716 (noting that the images were beyond the plain view of the officers). 
 266. See generally United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); 
People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
 267. See e.g., Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 716 (“A ‘plain view’ argument for 
discovery of the child pornography also fails because the consented search was limited to a 
concern for the ‘[illegal] credit card activity over the Internet,’ not images.”). 
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contained in image files that fell beyond the scope of the consented search 
and it does not appear from the facts that any of these images were open in 
plain view.268  The opening of these image files took the officers beyond the 
scope of their permissible search into areas of the computer in which they 
did not have consent to enter.  As such, a plain view argument also fails in 
Prinzing and Parson for essentially the same reasons that it failed in 
Richardson; none of the pornographic images seized in these three cases 
successfully falls under the plain view doctrine. 
IV.  Suggested Rule to Provide Clearer Guidance 
When law enforcement officers, acting as fully disclosed officers of 
the law, request consent to search from a suspect, they must fully disclose 
the main purpose of their visit in order for any subsequently rendered 
consent to be valid. 
These cases offer three different fact scenarios that are similar in 
some respects, yet decidedly different in others.269  In each case, the 
police gained access to the suspects’ personal property through the use 
of subterfuge.270  Each ruse was slightly different from the others, but 
the overall impact was roughly the same.271  In each instance, the 
police gained access to the suspects’ property under the guise of 
providing aid rather than investigating a potential crime.272  It proved 
to be highly successful from a crime-fighting standpoint; in each 
instance the officers found numerous images of illegal child 
pornography.273  It was a failure in other respects as each of the 
defendants’ suppression motions were granted, thus leaving the law 
enforcement officers back where they started—with nothing.274  In 
each of the cases, it was the officers’ own words that ultimately 
provided an unintended limitation on the scope of their searches, 
                                                                                                                 
 268. See generally United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); 
People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
 269. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008); 
United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); People v. Prinzing, 907 
N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694; Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592; Prinzing, 907 
N.E. 2d 87. 
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because the courts used the scope of the defendants’ consent to limit 
the searches.275  In only one case did a court actually determine that the 
consent itself was invalid.276  Although Parson’s personal 
characteristics seemed to be a controlling factor in the district court’s 
decision, the other factors present in Parson were very similar to those 
of Prinzing and Richardson.277  In each case, the courts ultimately 
arrived at the constitutionally correct decision.278  It is clear, both from 
the facts and holdings of each case, that a unified, guiding standard is 
necessary.  Such a standard would not only serve as a protective device 
for citizens’ constitutional rights, but it would also provide clearer 
guidance for law enforcement officers so that they can be more 
effective in their pursuit of crime. 
Finding such a standard is no easy task.  As the Court in Lewis 
noted, a per se rule banning the use of deception by undercover police 
officers would unduly hamper law enforcement officers in their pursuit 
of crime.279  However, the Court’s decision in that case was focused on 
the specific area of undercover officers, not police officers in 
general.280  Furthermore, the Court was reluctant to establish an 
outright prohibition on the use of deception, but they did not address 
the possibility of creating a rule outlining the permissible use of 
deception without completely prohibiting such deception281  The three 
cases discussed in this paper differ from Lewis in that none of the 
officers involved were working undercover.282  They all arrived at the 
suspects’ homes dressed in some sort of police garb and they all 
immediately identified themselves as officers of the law.283  In fact, 
                                                                                                                 
 275. Id. 
 276. See United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592, 608–09 (W.D. Pa. 2009) 
(concluding that Parson’s consent to the search was invalid). 
 277. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008); 
United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); People v. Prinzing, 907 
N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
 278. Id. 
 279. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (stating that a per se rule 
about the use of deception by undercover agents would unduly hamper law enforcement 
officers in the pursuit of crime). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008); 
United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); People v. Prinzing, 907 
N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
 283. Id. 
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this was essential to their ruse, since they wanted the suspects to 
believe that they were there to investigate legitimate identity threats to 
the suspects.284  Their position as police officers added credibility to 
their story and allowed them to convince the suspects that they were 
there to help.285  This is a decidedly different scenario from that of 
undercover police work, which could be the subject for an entirely 
different legal discussion. 
Although difficult, it is not impossible to formulate a workable 
rule to address police conduct in scenarios similar to that of three cases 
discussed above.  However, such a rule cannot, and should not, be 
applied broadly across the entire spectrum of police work.  As 
mentioned above, undercover police work is very different from the 
type of work the police officers were conducting in the above cases.  
This rule is therefore only applicable to scenarios in which police 
officers are operating as fully disclosed officers of the law while 
requesting access to a suspect’s personal property.  When operating as 
such, police officers must fully inform the suspect of the main purpose 
of their visit in order to validly obtain any consent to search.286  This 
proposed rule is simple in theory, but it requires a fact intensive 
analysis.  The main purpose of the officers’ visit to a citizen’s home 
should be determined from a wide variety of objectively reviewed 
factors, including:  the nature of the officer’s primary assignments and 
the nature of the evidence previously collected by the officer in 
connection to the suspect.287  Such a rule would prevent officers who 
were assigned primarily to child pornography cases from using the 
remote and unsubstantiated possibility that a suspect has been the 
victim of identity theft as a means to gain that suspect’s consent to a 
search.  At its core, the use of such tactics essentially induces the 
suspect to consent to a lie under the reasonable, yet incorrect, 
assumption that the officers are there to help.  This rule eliminates that 
possibility, requiring the police to state the real purpose of their visit 
                                                                                                                 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See Michael J. Friedman, Another Stab at Schneckloth:  The Problem of Limited 
Consent Searches and Plain View Seizures, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 313, 344 (1998) 
(noting that any rule which focuses on the subjective intent of police officers is easy to 
manipulate and difficult to enforce).  
 287.  See David John Housholder, Note, Reconciling Consent Searches and Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence:  Incorporating Privacy into the Test for Valid Consent Searches, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1279, 1294 (2005) (noting that many court decisions show a tendency to 
favor objective standards). 
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or actually produce legitimate evidence of an alternate reason for their 
visit. 
The rule provides a clearly delineated guideline that can serve as a 
protective device to ensure that the Fourth Amendment rights of 
citizens are not violated by the police.  Without such a rule, these 
rights could easily erode in the face of illegitimate police tactics.  A 
clear guideline, such as this rule, would solidify and preserve the 
Fourth Amendment rights that our forefathers valued so dearly.288  The 
construction of this rule serves to deter uniformed officers from 
abusing their position of trust by advancing a lie in order to gain a 
suspect’s consent to search.  The requirement that officers disclose the 
main purpose of their visit is the key element that creates the 
restriction necessary to protect citizens from unlawful and 
unconstitutional searches and seizures in the specific scenario 
described above.  With this rule in place, suspects will actually know 
what they are consenting to, thus preserving their Fourth Amendment 
rights as citizens.  But this rule only applies when government agents 
are acting as fully disclosed officers of the law.  In this way, the rule 
will not hamper police officers engaged in legitimate undercover work.  
Therefore the rule does not infringe upon this important, legally 
sanctioned area of police work. 
Furthermore, this rule can have an overall beneficial effect for law 
enforcement officers as well.  If officers adhere to the rule, any 
evidence they collect will be admissible, in turn allowing prosecutors 
to move forward with their case.289  As a result, there can be more 
successful prosecutions of legitimate criminals.  In the cases described 
above, each of the suspects clearly violated the law,290 but each suspect 
ultimately escaped punishment because the police violated their 
constitutional rights.291  This rule has the potential to stop scenarios 
like this by providing police officers with a guideline that allows them 
                                                                                                                 
 288. See William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule:  
Justice Stewart’s Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, 31 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1036–37 (1994) (chronicling the rise of Fourth Amendment principles 
in colonial America beginning in 1776). 
 289. See e.g., Creekmore v. State, 800 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (stating 
that the state bears the burden of proving that evidence was properly gathered, and therefore 
admissible at trial). 
 290. See generally United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d 694 (W.D. Pa. 2008); 
United States v. Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009); People v. Prinzing, 907 
N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
 291. Id.  
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to pursue criminals in a manner that is consistent with the U.S. 
Constitution.  Police officers undoubtedly have a difficult and 
frustrating job, but this rule could ease some of these frustrations by 
providing officers with a guideline for gathering evidence in a manner 
that will not later render such evidence inadmissible.  Admittedly, 
officers might initially feel frustrated that they must adhere to a strict 
guideline while gathering evidence.  But, in the end, it will be far less 
frustrating than watching legitimate criminals go unpunished.  
Ultimately, this rule could allow government officers to have greater 
success in identifying and prosecuting the crimes that undermine the 
safety of an ordered society. 
Consequently, this rule has potential benefits for both citizens and 
police officers.  Citizens can place their trust in police officers, 
knowing that their constitutionally guaranteed protections are still 
valid, while the officers have greater guidance in successfully 
obtaining evidence.  By obtaining success in both of these areas, 
harmony can be reached between the rights of citizens and the duty of 
police officers to pursue and extinguish criminal activity. 
The three cases discussed above292 undoubtedly present a difficult 
scenario for courts to analyze.  On the one hand, courts must balance 
the Fourth Amendment rights afforded to all citizens.  On the other, 
courts must balance the ever-pressing need to successfully pursue and 
eliminate crime.  Both factors are essential to modern society.  The 
courts in the above cases wrestled with these competing interests, 
ultimately arriving at proper conclusions.293  But the analysis was not 
perfect, nor was it clearly guided by a useful rule.294  When law 
enforcement officers, acting as fully disclosed officers of the law, 
request consent to search from a suspect, they must fully disclose the 
main purpose of their visit in order for any subsequently rendered 
consent to be valid.  A rule, such as this one, could provide greater 
guidance for both courts and law enforcement officers, while 
                                                                                                                 
 292. See Richardson, 583 F.Supp. 2d at 724–25 (granting defendant’s motion to 
suppress evidence seized during a consensual search of the defendant’s computer because 
the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent); Parson, 599 F.Supp. 2d at 612 
(granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during search of the defendant’s 
computer because defendant’s consent to search was invalid); Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d at 100 
(concluding that suppression of evidence seized during a consensual search was warranted 
because the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
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simultaneously protecting the rights of citizens, no matter what their 
accused crime.  It is a difficult subject area, but answers must be 
found.  Such answers could serve to benefit both citizens and police 
officers alike, fostering an environment that is beneficial to all. 
V.  Conclusion 
Justice Cardozo once lamented the idea that a “criminal is to go free 
because the constable has blundered.”295  Such is the scenario in the three 
cases discussed above.296  It is certainly lamentable that suspects in 
possession of child pornography are able to suppress its evidence due to the 
over-extension of the police search.297  There is, at some point, a basic 
notion that justice is not served by allowing such criminals to escape 
punishment for these crimes, but there is the equally compelling need for 
citizens to safely place their trust in the officers of the law.  In the cases at 
hand, police officers used surreptitious methods to identify and apprehend 
criminals.298  Although they made no attempt to hide who they were, they 
still made an effort to shield their true intentions in an attempt to deceive 
the citizens to whom they were speaking.299  The officers used their position 
of trust as a means to implement deceptive action.  By allowing such action 
to go unchecked, courts serve to undermine the fundamental protections of 
the Fourth Amendment.300  Citizens must be able to trust their government 
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and its officials.  The absence of such trust has the potential to cause more 
damage than affording the full array of Fourth Amendment rights to 
suspected criminals.  The courts in the three cases above struggled to 
address this issue and ultimately reached the correct conclusion, preserving 
what is left of the Fourth Amendment.301  However, clearer guidance is 
undoubtedly needed in order to guarantee correct results in the future.  
Continuing forward without such guidance is not only ill-advised, but also 
invidious to the fundamental principles upon which our government is 
founded.302  “Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its 
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its 
own existence.”303 
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